Public Safety, Panhandling, and Protecting Free Speech by Greenlee, Julie J.
Public Safety, Panhandling, and Protecting Free
Speech
July 26, 2018
Julie J. Greenlee, Senior Staff Editor
City governments across the country have met opposition from the courts when attempting to pass
panhandling ordinances.  Panhandling is de ned as “any in-person solicitation for immediate charitable
giving of either cash or goods for the purpose of bene tting the person doing the soliciting.”  In the past
couple years, municipalities located in Illinois, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
elsewhere have been unsuccessful in passing panhandling ordinances because the courts have deemed
these unconstitutional.  The main reasons cited for these rejections are issues surrounding the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and protection of free speech.  After the case of Reed v.
Town of Gilbert,  the courts of many states have begun to reevaluate the permissibility of ordinances
that may affect free speech on a less obvious level. In Reed, the town ordinance attempted to restrict
the placement of religious services signs to only certain locations.  The Supreme Court ruled that
because the town’s sign code imposed “content-based restrictions” on speech, and the restrictions
failed to survive strict scrutiny requiring the government “to prove that the restriction furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest”, the ordinance was in violation of
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech.
While the Reed case is dissimilar in some context to the issue of panhandling, it has been interpreted
and applied to cases in which the panhandling ordinances many cities have attempted to pass, or which
have already been in place, have been rejected by the courts.  For example, in February 2017, the
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a decade-old Lexington municipal law prohibiting begging in streets
and intersections was a violation of the First Amendment.  In that case, Champion v. Commonwealth,
 the defendant had been arrested for violating the begging ordinance through the act of holding a sign
and begging for  nancial assistance at a major intersection.  The Kentucky Supreme Court held that
the language of the municipal ordinance was “unambiguously content-based” and in violation of the
First Amendment because it prohibited public discussion in a public forum only for a certain topic, that
topic being the message panhandlers convey when soliciting for immediate charitable giving.
Furthermore, for Lexington to be able to overcome the content-based issue, the city had the burden of
proof of showing a “compelling public interest” in order to survive the court’s strict scrutiny.  The
purported interest of the city in enforcing the ordinance was the promotion of public safety as well as
the free  ow of tra c.  Ultimately, the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that public safety may be a
legitimate compelling interest, but that the city had failed to provide substantial evidence that prohibiting
panhandling furthered this interest to the degree that the ordinance could survive strict scrutiny over the
content-based language issue.
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As in the example of Lexington’s municipal ordinance to prevent panhandling, the reason behind
rejection of such ordinances is mainly because “content-based” language threatens the Constitutional
right of freedom of speech.  In the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court, and those from other
states, this has been the primary reason for rejecting ordinances that would curtail the ability of people
to participate in panhandling at major arterial roadways and intersections.  However, the Kentucky
Supreme Court actually instructed Lexington’s municipal government on how the ordinance might be
rephrased in order to prevent a blatant violation of Constitutional rights.  In the municipality’s attempt
to enact an ordinance for the same original purpose, the language was changed to include all
pedestrians, not just people who are begging, and prohibits pedestrians from being “in” the public
roadways.  Furthermore, Lexington’s jaywalking ordinance now reads as preventing all pedestrians
from crossing the street “at any place except the crosswalk.”  Effectively, this means panhandlers may
not walk or step into the street from the sidewalk in order to accept money from a motorist stopped at a
tra c light, nor may they leave the crosswalk. In this careful re-structuring of the municipal ordinance,
there appears to be the same underlying purpose of preventing panhandling, perhaps along with
increasing public safety.
Kentucky’s Supreme Court found that there was a lack of supporting evidence for the “compelling
interests” of Lexington’s government to promote public safety and prevent pedestrians from being
harmed.  To overcome the issue of content-based language, there must be a legitimate “public safety
concern” and strong evidence that this concern is of high importance.  This is where Lexington’s most
recent ordinance raises questions about the actual purpose of promoting bans on panhandling. As the
court stated in Champion, “no evidence of tra c delays or auto accidents resulting from pedestrians—
panhandlers in particular—approaching stopped motorists” was provided in support of a compelling
government interest in enforcing the ordinance.  Another underlying but unspoken issue is the fact that
there have been more complaints from the public about panhandlers’ presence, and concerns about
increases in aggressive and harassing behavior.  There is little statistical data from Lexington itself,
rather than from national databases, to support pedestrian safety issues as the purpose behind the
ordinance. It is di cult to say whether the general grievances of Lexingtonians about the increased
number of panhandlers play a signi cant role in promoting a panhandling ordinance, or whether there is
a genuine and signi cant public safety concern. With the recent approval of a revised ordinance just last
year, which bans all pedestrians from entering arterial roadways or leaving the crosswalk, the city might
now consider publishing updated statistics to re ect how this ordinance might be serving the public
interest and promoting pedestrian safety.
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